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MANDATORY ARREST FOR 
MISDEMEANOR DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE: IS ALASKA’S ARREST 
STATUTE CONSTITUTIONAL? 
BY PAUL A. CLARK* 
ABSTRACT 
Alaska defines “domestic violence” in a way that is broader than most of 
 the country. Additionally, it requires arrest for a wide variety of offences 
 classified as domestic violence, including many misdemeanors. This 
 regime violates both the United States and Alaska Constitutions in a 
 number of ways. The statute imposes a penalty prior to a determination of 
 guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, violating due process. It violates equal 
 protection interests by treating individuals who commit similar crimes 
 differently based on whether or not their crimes are classified as 
 “domestic.” Finally, it violates Fourth Amendment protections by 
 requiring warrantless arrests absent “exigent circumstances.” 
INTRODUCTION 
In the last two decades, states and the federal government have 
adopted a number of new approaches to deal with “domestic violence.”  
A number of states, including Alaska, now require warrantless arrest for 
some misdemeanors, which traditionally required officers to obtain an 
arrest warrant.1  Proponents of mandatory (warrantless) arrest argue 
that: (1) it deters individual criminals from assaulting someone again 
when punishment in the form of arrest is swift and sure; (2) it deters 
others generally from committing assault because they know that arrest 
will be the immediate result and this general deterrence also reinforces 
 
* J.D. University of Chicago, 2005; Ph.D. The Catholic University of America, 
1995. The author currently works as a Public Defender in Ketchikan, Alaska.  He 
has worked as a judicial clerk for the Hon. Robert Eastaugh, Alaska Supreme 
Court, and to the Hon. Consuelo Callahan, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
 1. See COMM’N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, AM. BAR ASS’N, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
ARREST POLICIES BY STATE (2007), http://www.abanet.org/domviol/docs/ 
Domestic_Violence_Arrest_Policies_by_State_11_07.pdf. 
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societal norms against assault; and (3) immediate arrest protects victims 
from further violence. 
Opponents of mandatory arrest argue that: (1) because domestic 
violence is a crime of passion arrest is unlikely to deter crime; (2) arrest 
before all the facts are known leads to the arrest of innocent people; (3) 
mandatory arrest often punishes the alleged victim as well as the 
suspect since a bread-winner may lose his job after being arrested, or the 
arrest may cause the suspect to retaliate further against the victim upon 
release; and (4) fear of these adverse consequences may lead victims to 
refuse to call police for help out of fear that arrest will be the result. 
This Article demonstrates that Alaska’s domestic violence statute 
suffers from a number of different infirmities. Part I sets the stage for the 
Article by looking at a typical example of domestic violence and by 
examining the different historical approaches to domestic violence laws.  
Part II describes how Alaska defines “domestic violence” in an 
exceptionally broad way compared to other states. This Article then 
argues that the statute requiring police to arrest domestic violence 
suspects is subject to at least three constitutional objections.  Part III 
suggests that the statute appears to have been adopted to ensure swift 
punishment for abusers although punishment of suspects prior to trial is 
unconstitutional. Part IV contends that subjecting domestic violence 
suspects to warrantless arrest violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Alaska Constitution in that those suspects are treated differently than 
are similarly situated individuals who are suspected of otherwise 
identical, but non-domestic violence. Finally, Part V argues that 
warrantless arrest probably violates constitutional principles that 
specifically limit when, where, and how an arrest can be made. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. A Typical Example 
The following is from the police report in a misdemeanor assault 
case from Ketchikan, Alaska (the last names and the address have been 
omitted): 
On 11-21-07 [the day before Thanksgiving], at 2216 hours a 
report was received from Russell [a neighbor] of a domestic 
violence situation occurring in the apartment below them.  
[Russell] stated he could hear screaming and cussing and at 
one point the girl screamed as if she were in pain.  Upon arrival 
at the residence, Erica was contacted.  Her face was puffy, her 
eyes swollen as if she had been crying and two scratches were 
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observed at the back of her left upper arm.  She stated she and 
Tony had been in an argument but everything was fine now.  
Tony was in bed.  When he got up he was belligerent and 
demanded AST [Alaska State Troopers] leave his residence.  
Erica started crying and stated she was afraid [Tony] was going 
to get angry.  She said that all she wanted was for [Tony] to be 
home for Thanksgiving day.  . . . [T]he on call District Attorney 
was contacted.  It was decided [Tony] would be arrested for 
assault in the fourth degree due to the nature of the original 
complaint, the condition of both [Erica] and [Tony] and the 
likelihood of a serious assault occurring if [Tony] was left at 
home.2 
A few other details should be noted.3  Erica told the trooper when 
he showed up at the door that he could not come in and that she wanted 
to be left alone.  He forced his way inside and examined her for injuries.  
She had two scratches on her left arm, which Erica said she had received 
earlier when she retrieved her baby’s toy from behind a thorn bush.  
Tony was arrested in his underwear and taken to jail.  Erica tried to go 
to the jail to bail him out, as the next day was Thanksgiving.  She was 
told he was being held on “no bail” and could not be released until he 
was brought before a judge the next afternoon. Despite these 
inconveniences and humiliations, the charges were dropped before trial 
due to insufficient evidence to proceed. 
The above example is typical of alleged domestic disputes.  Police 
often find a highly ambiguous situation with the suspected victim 
uncooperative.4  Often there is no clear evidence that a crime was in fact 
committed.  How should the state respond? 
Now consider what happens when suspects are arrested.  They are 
put in handcuffs, locked in the back of a police car, taken to jail, strip 
searched then locked in a jail cell for hours waiting to see a judge.  Often 
suspects are locked in a holding cell with suspected criminals who may 
threaten or physically abuse other prisoners.  For most people, a first 
arrest is a terrifying experience. Even if a person is never convicted of 
anything, a record of arrest may still be used against a person.  
Moreover, arrest is humiliating and often carries a number of indirect 
 
 2. Alaska State Trooper report 07-98461 (Nov. 21, 2007) (on file with 
author). 
 3.  These additional details are Erica’s account to the author. 
 4.  See Donald J. Rebovich, Prosecution Response to Domestic Violence: Results 
of a Survey of Large Jurisdictions, in DO ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 
176, 185–86 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996) (noting about a third of 
prosecutors surveyed reported that most alleged victims refused to cooperate in 
the prosecution of their alleged domestic abusers). 
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costs associated with it.5 For some workers, missing even a single day of 
work can mean the loss of a job. Even when a person is released without 
bail, suspects are still typically subject to significant restrictions on 
liberty such as travel restrictions and, in domestic violence cases, often 
prohibited from returning to their own home.6 
There are times when arrest and incarceration are necessary to stop 
violence or recover stolen property, for example.  But mandatory arrest 
will unquestionably lead to the arrest of innocent people (even setting 
aside the principle that every suspect is innocent until proven guilty).  A 
number of studies have concluded that pro-arrest and mandatory arrest 
laws have led to an increase in innocent people (often the victim of a 
crime) being arrested.7  This appears to be particularly true with respect 
to mandatory arrest.8  Mandatory arrests are likely to occur at the early 
stages of an investigation before all of the facts are known. Arrest 
requires the officer to have probable cause of a crime having been 
committed, but probable cause is not a high standard.9  Generally, there 
 
 5. Donna Welch, Comment, Mandatory Arrest of Domestic Abusers: Panacea or 
Perpetuation of the Problem of Abuse, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 1133, 1148 (1994) (“Arrest 
may also trigger indirect costs for offenders such as humiliation, divorce or 
separation from their partners, and loss of job.”) (quoting MICHAEL STEINMAN, 
Coordinated Criminal Justice Interventions and Recidivism Among Batterers, in 
WOMAN BATTERING: POLICY RESPONSES 221, 222 (1991)). 
 6. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.027(b) (2009), amended by Act of July 1, 2010, 
2010 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 19, § 8. 
 7. Eve S. Buzawa & Gerald T. Hotaling, The Impact of Relationship Status, 
Gender, and Minor Status in the Police Response to Domestic Assaults, 1 VICTIMS & 
OFFENDERS 323 (2006); Meda Chesney-Lind, Criminalizing Victimization: The 
Unintended Consequences of Pro-Arrest Policies for Girls and Women, 2 CRIMINOLOGY 
& PUB. POL’Y 81, 84 (2002); Dana A. Jones & Joanne Belknap, Police Reponses to 
Battering in a Progressive Pro-Arrest Jurisdiction, 16 JUST. Q. 249, 265 (1999); Daniel 
G. Saunders, The Tendency to Arrest Victims of Domestic Violence, 10 J. 
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 147, 148 (1995). According to a study by the 
Municipality of Anchorage in 2000, thirteen percent of the cases involved dual 
aggressors. See MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE, ANALYSIS OF POLICE ACTION AND 
CHARACTERISTICS OF REPORTED DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN ANCHORAGE, ALASKA TEN 
YEAR STUDY 1989–1998 10 (2000), available at 
http://www.muni.org/Departments/health/services/Documents/dv_study%
5B1%5D.pdf (“Dual aggressors indicate the officer determined both parties met 
the statutory definition for principle physical aggressor.”). 
 8.  See David Hirschel et al., Domestic Violence and Mandatory Arrest Laws: To 
What Extent Do They Influence Police Arrest Decisions?, 98 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 255, 296 (2007) (“Mandatory arrest laws may lead officers to adopt 
a legalistic orientation,” to “apply the law in a mechanistic style,” and to arrest 
more people than they would if given discretion.). 
 9. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1925) (quoting 
Commonwealth v. Carey, 66 Mass. 246, 251 (1853)) (stating that an officer has 
probable cause “‘if he suspects one on his own knowledge of facts, or on facts 
communicated to him by others, and thereupon he has reasonable ground to 
believe that the accused has been guilty of felony’”). 
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is probable cause for arrest when a person says “she slapped me.” Some 
non-trivial percent of people arrested, taken to jail, strip searched and 
held for hours in a cell, have done absolutely nothing wrong, morally or 
legally.  It may turn out after further investigation that the person 
arrested is entirely innocent, or even the victim of a crime.  Nevertheless, 
some writers have argued that arrest is justifiable as a form of 
punishment.10 
B. Legal Responses to Domestic Violence Throughout History 
In the early Nineteenth Century it was not a crime for a man to 
“chastise” his wife, but it was a crime to cause her serious injury.11  “By 
the 1870s, however, there was no judge or treatise writer in the United 
States who recognized a husband’s prerogative to chastise his wife.”12 
Under American constitutional law, the family and the home are 
accorded special protection.  In 1923, the Supreme Court acknowledged 
the constitutional rights “to marry, establish a home and bring up 
children.”13  Similarly, “[a]t the very core of the Fourth Amendment 
stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free 
from unreasonable governmental intrusion.”14  Spouses generally could 
not be compelled to testify against each other.15  Parents have a 
constitutional right, within limits, to spank or discipline children which 
would be assault in other contexts.16  Thus marriage, family, and the 
home have been accorded a variety of legal privileges.17 
Prior to the 1980s, arrests for “domestic disputes” were rare.  This 
may have been based partly on theories about the role of government, 
but was also based on an assessment of the effectiveness of arrest and 
 
10. See infra Part III and text accompanying notes 89–92. 
11. Reva B. Seigel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 
105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2123 (1996). 
12. Id. at 2129. 
13. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
14. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) (quoting Silverman v. 
United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)). 
15. See Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 77 (1958) (“The basic 
reason . . . was a belief that such a policy was necessary to foster family peace, 
not only for the benefit of husband, wife and children, but for the benefit of the 
public as well.”). 
16. See, e.g., L.A.M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827, 832 n.13 (Alaska 1976). 
17. See, e.g., Elizabeth Pleck, Criminal Approaches to Family Violence 1640–1980, 
in 11 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 19 (Lloyd Ohlin & Michael Tonry 
eds., 1989). Some writers have noted the unusual alliance of pro-law 
enforcement conservatives who want to expand the power of police with 
women’s advocates who have typically been against expanding police power.  
See Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of 
Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1675–81 (2004). 
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criminal prosecution.  An influential 1984 U.S. Attorney General’s 
Report (“Report”) described how this early assessment came to be: 
“During the sixties, police trainers relied on the literature of 
psychologists and social scientists who believed that arrest was 
inappropriate because it exacerbated the violence, broke up families, 
and caused the abuser to lose his job.  Consequently, mediation was the 
preferable solution to family violence incidents.”18 
The Report went on explain: 
The original shift by law enforcement to mediation [in the 
1960s] was done for the most commendable reasons.  They 
were responding to early assumptions of psychologists and 
sociologists and to signals from prosecutors and judges.  But a 
recent research experiment is challenging these traditional 
beliefs that mediation is the appropriate law enforcement 
response.19 
The Minneapolis domestic violence research experiment conducted 
by Lawrence Sherman and Richard Berk20 was widely lauded and 
embraced by the Reagan Justice Department.  Again to quote the Report: 
The results of the research demonstrated that arrest and 
overnight incarceration are the most effective interventions to 
reduce the likelihood of subsequent acts of family violence.  A 
victim’s chance of future assault was nearly two and a half 
times greater when officers did not make an arrest. Attempting 
to counsel both parties or sending the assailant away from 
home for several hours were found to be considerably less 
effective in deterring future violence.21 
The Report recommended that “states should enact laws to permit 
law enforcement officers to make warrantless arrests for misdemeanor 
offenses involving family violence, when the officer has probable cause 
to believe that a crime has occurred and the safety of the family is in 
jeopardy.”22 The Report also recognized that “the arrest and brief 
 
18. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S TASKFORCE ON FAMILY 
VIOLENCE, FINAL REPORT 22 (1984), available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/ 
PDFS/ED251762.pdf. 
19. Id. at 24 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, 
COMPENSATING VICTIMS OF CRIME: AN ANALYSES OF AMERICAN PROGRAMS (1983)). 
20. For a summary of the Minneapolis study, see LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN & 
RICHARD A. BERK, POLICE FOUNDATION REPORTS: THE MINNEAPOLIS DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE EXPERIMENT (1984), available at http://www.policefoundation.org/ 
pdf/minneapolisdve.pdf. 
21. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 18, at 24. 
22. Id. at 103–04 (emphasis added). 
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detention may increase the abuser’s anger and hostility against family 
members” and so a “cooling-off period” of continued detention was 
recommended.23  However, the Report suggested that overnight hold 
should be required only when the “probability is great” that there 
would be continued violence.24  The Report also explained that (when 
there was a threat to justify continued detention) longer detention is 
preferable because “a short detainment is merely an aggravating 
inconvenience rather than a serious sanction deterring future 
violence.”25  The Report never suggested mandatory arrest whenever 
there was probable cause of a crime, but recommended arrest “in 
situations involving serious injury to the victim, use or threatened use of 
a weapon, violation of a protective order, or other imminent danger to 
the victim.”26  It cautioned: “Law enforcement ordinarily do not arrest 
two strangers who have shoved each other; neither ought they arrest 
two family members engaged in similar behavior.”27 
Armed with the Minneapolis study, the imprimatur of the 
conservative Reagan administration, and the lure of federal grant 
money, cities and states around the country adopted pro-arrest 
policies.28  However, many states went well beyond the suggestions of 
the Attorney General’s Report and mandated arrest for crimes of 
domestic violence. 
The Minneapolis study was recreated in a number of cities using 
larger samples and longer surveys.29 Based on these new studies, 
Sherman, the main author of the Minneapolis study, came out against 
mandatory arrest and called for repeal of mandatory arrest laws: 
Repeal mandatory arrest laws.  The most compelling 
implication of these findings is to challenge the wisdom of 
mandatory arrest. States and cities that have enacted such laws 
should repeal them, especially if they have substantial ghetto 
poverty populations with high unemployment rates.  These are 
 
23. Id. at 105. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 17. 
27. Id. at 4. 
28. In 1994 the federal government began making millions of dollars in grant 
money available to states which “encourage or mandate arrests of domestic 
violence offenders based on probable cause that an offense has been 
committed.” Safe Homes for Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 
§ 40231(a)(3), 108 Stat. 1796, 1932 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3796h(c)(1)(A) (2006)). 
29. See, e.g., Joan Zorra, Must We Stop Arresting Batterers?: Analysis and Policy 
Implications of New Police Domestic Violence Studies, 28 New Eng. L. Rev. 929 
(1994) (detailing six Minneapolis study replication experiments). 
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the settings in which mandatory arrest policies are most likely 
to backfire.30 
In 2001 the Department of Justice published another study 
synthesizing all the previous studies, and while it found there might be 
some slight, marginal deterrence effect to mandatory arrest the study 
ultimately questioned the practicality of mandatory arrest: 
[O]ur research showed that a majority of suspects discontinued 
their aggressive behaviors even without an arrest.  This 
suggests that policies requiring arrest for all suspects may 
unnecessarily take a community’s resources away from 
identifying and responding to the worst offenders and victims 
most at risk.  Our research has documented the size of the 
specific deterrent effect of arrest, which, although consistent 
across sites and time, appeared modest compared with the 
overall percentage of suspects desisting from intimate partner 
violence.31 
Indeed, weight of opinion is against mandatory arrest given that it has 
not been shown to be effective.32 
However, once the effectiveness of mandatory arrest was called 
into doubt a number of writers began to argue that mandatory arrest 
was proper punishment for batterers.  Even the 1984 Attorney General’s 
Report called arrest “a serious sanction deterring future violence.”33  
One author argued in 1997 that even if arrest has no deterrent effect it is 
defensible because “[a]rrest, as part of a community response, will 
provide just punishment for batterers.”34 A student author of a law 
review article put it this way: 
 
30. Janell D. Schmidt & Lawrence W. Sherman, Does Arrest Deter Domestic 
Violence?, in DO ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK?, supra note 4, at 43, 51. 
31. CHRISTOPHER D. MAXWELL ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EFFECTS OF ARREST 
ON INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: NEW EVIDENCE FROM THE SPOUSE ASSAULT 
REPLICATION PROGRAM 13 (2001), available at www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/ 
188199.pdf. 
32. Recent authors have largely treated it as a settled question that 
mandatory arrest does not deter domestic violence. Doctor Richard J. Gelles, a 
leading scholar on domestic violence, regards the deterrence argument as an 
example of false information spread about domestic violence. Richard J. Gelles, 
Perspectives on Family Law and Social Science Research: The Politics of Research: The 
Use, Abuse, and Misuse of Social Science Data—The Cases of Intimate Partner 
Violence, 45 FAM. CT. REV. 42, 47 (2007); see also Michael Tonry, Learning from the 
Limitations of Deterence Research, 37 CRIME & JUST. 279, 283–87 (2008). This author 
has not found any article published in the last several years that advocates 
mandatory arrest. 
33. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 18, at 105. 
34. Michael M. Hoctor, Domestic Violence as a Crime Against the State: The Need 
for Mandatory Arrest in California, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 643, 647 (1997). 
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To counter the argument that arresting attackers often does 
more harm than good for the victims of domestic violence, 
advocates of the statutes suggest that just because the arrests 
do not provide a perfect and infallible deterrent is no reason to 
decide that they do not work. 
There’s deterrent, but also punishment . . . . We don’t have 
people calling for the repeal of burglary laws because they 
don’t have a deterrent effect. Why not arrest someone who 
has committed a crime? A crime is a crime is a crime.  It 
should be treated the same in a home as it is on the street.35 
Thus, advocates suggest that the certainty of punishment provided by 
such laws makes them valuable despite their limited effectiveness in 
deterring domestic violence. 
II.  THE SCOPE OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE STATUTES IN ALASKA 
COMPARED TO ELSEWHERE 
A. Scope and Background of the Alaska Mandatory Arrest Statute 
In 1996 the Alaska legislature passed the Domestic Violence 
Prevention and Victim Protection Act, which mandated arrest for a wide 
variety of offenses designated as domestic violence.36 Section 18.65.530 
of the Alaska Statutes requires police to arrest a suspect any time there is 
probable cause that a crime involving domestic violence has occurred 
within the prior twelve hours.37 However, there is an “escape 
mechanism” by which police may get the district attorney’s 
authorization to forego arrest.38  Section 12.30.027(e) of the Alaska 
 
35. Toni Harvey, Student Work, Batterers Beware: West Virginia Responds to 
Domestic Violence with the Probable Cause Warrantless Arrest Statute, 97 W. VA. L. 
REV. 181, 211 (1994) (quoting Jennifer Toth, New Study of Domestic Violence Finds 
Mandatory Arrests Backfire, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1991, at A5). One article studied 
the range of options available to police: making suggestions, mediating between 
disputants, issuing warnings, threatening to arrest if conduct is not stopped, 
issuing citations, and finally arrest (the most extreme tool in the police arsenal). 
See Robert E. Worden, Situational and Attitudinal Explanations of Police Behavior: A 
Theoretical Assessment, 23 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 667, 680 (1989). In this article, which 
studied traffic stops, arrest was the end result in only 11.8% of the cases. Id. 
36. Domestic Violence Prevention and Protection Act of 1996, 1996 Alaska 
Sess. Laws, ch. 64, § 29 (codified at ALASKA STAT. § 18.68.530 (2010)). 
37. ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.530(a) (2010). 
38. Id. § 18.65.530(c). It is unclear how often this escape mechanism is 
employed, but it is almost certainly the exception rather than the rule.  Under 
section 18.65.530(e) of the Alaska Statutes, police are required to file a report 
explaining why there was no arrest so further research may find statistics on 
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Statutes requires that the suspect be held without bail until brought 
before a judicial officer, which typically occurs the following day.39 This 
is supposed to prevent the suspect from posting bail and returning 
quickly to the scene of the alleged crime.40 Thus mandatory arrest in 
domestic violence cases always entails holding the suspect until 
arraigned before a magistrate. For other misdemeanors, a suspect who 
can post bail will be released.41 
In Alaska, “domestic violence” includes a variety of crimes.42 As 
the Alaska Court of Appeals has noted: “The phrase ‘domestic violence’ 
is normally understood to mean an assault committed by one domestic 
partner against another. But under section 18.66.990, this phrase is 
defined in a wide-ranging way, quite divorced from its everyday 
meaning . . . .”43 The list of domestic violence crimes is contained in 
section 18.66.990 of the Alaska Statutes: 
“[D]omestic violence” and “crime involving domestic violence” 
mean one or more of the following offenses or an offense under 
a law or ordinance of another jurisdiction having elements 
similar to these offenses, or an attempt to commit the offense, 
by a household member against another household member: 
 
(A) a crime against the person under [section 11.41 of the 
Alaska Statutes, which includes homicide, assault, stalking, 
reckless endangerment, kidnapping, custodial interference 
with parental rights, sexual assault, exploitation of minors, 
indecent exposure, robbery, extortion, and coercion]; 
(B) burglary . . . ; 
(C) criminal trespass . . . ; 
(D) arson or criminally negligent burning . . . [which includes 
negligently damaging the property of another by fire, 
regardless of the value of the property]; 
(E) criminal mischief . . . [which includes tampering with the 
property of another regardless of the value and intentionally 
damaging property worth $50 or more]; 
 
how often this occurs. See id. § 18.65.530(e). 
 39. See id. § 12.30.027(e). 
 40. See id. § 12.30.027(a)–(b). 
 41. See id. § 12.30.011. 
 42. See id. § 18.66.990. “Domestic violence” is a designation given to certain 
types of offenses. See id. For example, a defendant charged with criminal 
mischief in the first degree is charged under section 11.46.475 of the Alaska 
Statutes whether the offense is alleged to be against a “family member” or not.  
So “domestic violence” is not a crime; it is a designation given to an offense 
depending on the relationship of the accused to the alleged victim. 
 43. Cooper v. Dist. Court, 133 P.3d 692, 707 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006). 
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(F) terrorist threatening . . . ; 
(G) violating a protective order . . . ; or 
(H) harassment under [sections 11.61.120(a)(2)–(4) of the Alaska 
Statutes, which include telephoning with intent to impair the 
ability of the other party to place or receive calls, making 
repeated phone calls at inconvenient hours, and making an 
anonymous or obscene telephone call or communication].44 
Some of the offenses are serious, but many are not the type of offense 
that normally would result in arrest. 
The legislative record is not clear why Alaska adopted such a broad 
definition of a crime involving domestic violence.  The Deputy Attorney 
General, who testified in favor of the bill before the Judiciary 
Committee, acknowledged that there was no reason to arrest for 
misdemeanor criminal mischief “except in domestic violence situations 
because it is often a precursor to physical violence.”45 Little else was said 
about the scope of the listed crimes, and there is no indication that the 
legislature was aware that it was adopting a more expansive list of 
domestic violence crimes than any other state had done. 
The proponents of the Alaska bill cited the “Model Code on 
Domestic and Family Violence,” but this document did not specifically 
call for mandatory arrest.46 Rather, it suggested that states adopt one of 
two proposals: one calling for “presumptive arrest”47 and one calling for 
mandatory arrest.48 The Model Code simply said it was “left up to 
individual states” to determine which procedure was thought to work 
best.49 In the Summary, the document explains: “This Code treats 
domestic and family violence as a crime which requires early, aggressive 
and thorough intervention.”50 The Model Code contains a short 
commentary, which does shed some light on the purposes of the 
provisions.  The Commentary begins by noting that: 
 
 44. ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990 (2010). 
 45. Violating Domestic Violence Orders: Senate Judiciary Committee Notes 
on H.B. 314 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 19th Leg. (Alaska 1996) 
[hereinafter Committee Notes on H.B. 314] (statement of Laurie Otto on Tape 
96–39A). 
 46. See MODEL CODE ON DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE (Nat’l Council of 
Juvenile & Family Court Judges 1994), available at http://www.ncjfcj.org/ 
images/stories/dept/fvd/pdf/modecode_fin_printable.pdf. 
 47. Under “presumptive arrest,” police are instructed to presume that arrest 
is the appropriate response but have discretion not to arrest. See id. § 205(A). 
This is also known as “preferred arrest.” 
 48. See id. ch. 2, § 205, introductory cmt. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at intro. 
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Arrest appears to be an important deterrent to future domestic 
violence or family violence. The employment of presumptive or 
mandatory arrest practices may prevent domestic homicide.  
Arrest also conveys clear messages to victims, perpetrators and 
the community that domestic or family violence will not be 
tolerated and that perpetrators will be held accountable.51 
The paper further explains the rationale for mandatory arrest: 
Proponents of mandatory arrest suggest that law enforcement 
response to domestic violence has improved since the advent of 
mandatory arrest policies and statutes, providing victims 
immediate protection from the current violence, affording 
victims an opportunity to consider legal options, and providing 
victims a window of time for safe relocation or obtaining civil 
orders for protection. Victims are more likely to be assaulted 
immediately after law enforcement response to a call where no 
arrest was made than where arrests were made.52 
Finally, the document advocating warrantless arrest also states: 
“Research suggests that perpetrators are best deterred by swift and 
certain sanctions.”53 
There was little debate in the Alaska legislature on the Domestic 
Violence Act in general and on the mandatory arrest provision in 
particular. The only record of discussion that exists is the hearing on the 
bill held by the Judiciary Committee. Senator Lyda Green, a member of 
the committee, expressed concern that people charged with assault 
would be treated differently whether it was a neighbor or a co-
resident.54 Senator Robin Taylor, chair of the committee, did not 
comment on the arrest provision but did observe that treating family 
violence as a criminal matter and getting away from counseling and 
mediation would “not work well for couples that reconcile [and] by 
providing more punitive measures, the bill does not provide any 
incentive for couples to break the cycle of violence.”55 In response, Jayne 
Andreen of the Council on Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault—the 
main proponent testifying before the Judiciary Committee—commented: 
Most victims commonly say they return to the relationship 
because the system has not adequately worked for them.  This 
 
51. Id. § 205, introductory cmt. 
52. Id. § 205(B), cmt. 
53. Id. § 206, cmt. 
54. Committee Notes on HB-314, supra note 45 (statement of Sen. Green on 
Tape 96-39A). 
55. Id. (statement of Chairman Taylor on Tape 96-39B). 
CLARK_CPCXNS.DOC 12/9/2010  3:37:09 PM 
2010  MANDATORY ARREST FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 163 
bill will not make the problem go away but will make the 
criminal justice system more responsive to the immediate 
needs of victims. The system will ensure that immediate 
response will occur and sends the message that this behavior is 
a crime, not merely a family problem.56 
Andreen further explained that there was a real need for intervention: 
We have many problems in our criminal justice system that 
hinder our ability to respond to these crimes. Cultural factors 
often prohibit the victims from seeking help. The system does 
not hold offenders accountable and is slow and cumbersome in 
responding to these crimes. . . . In order to make real changes, 
the system must respond in a timely fashion and provide 
immediate consequences for domestic violence.57 
The only other explanation of the mandatory arrest provision was given 
by Deputy Attorney General Laurie Otto who commented that: “The 
Model Code recommends mandatory arrest because it sends the 
message that violent behavior is no longer a family problem, it is 
illegal.”58 But as noted above, the Model Code put forward presumptive 
arrest and mandatory arrest as equal options since research on the 
benefit of mandatory arrest was “not conclusive.”59 While legislative 
intent is difficult to discern, taken together the legislature’s reliance on 
the Model Code and the comments made by the bill’s backers suggest 
that the mandatory arrest statute may have been motivated at least in 
part by a desire to deter domestic violence. 
B.  Mandatory Arrest Statutes in Other States 
Most states have adopted an exception permitting warrantless 
arrests in domestic violence misdemeanors.60 However, mandatory 
arrest statutes in most other states are limited to actual assault or 
battery.61 One scholar has summarized the typical statute: 
 
56. Id. (statement of Jayne Andreen on Tape 96-39B). 
 57. Id. 
58. Id. (statement of Laurie Otto on Tape 96-39B). 
59. MODEL CODE ON DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE ch.2, § 205, introductory 
cmt. (Nat’l Council of Juvenile & Family Court Judges 1994). 
60. See Harvey, supra note 35, at 185. It appears that all American states now 
permit warrantless arrest in domestic violence assaults. See id. This is due in large 
part to the federal government which has encouraged states to change their 
statutes by providing millions of dollars in grants to states which permit such 
arrests. See id. at 185–86. 
61. In Alaska the crime “assault” covers both situations in which actual 
contact is made and those in which a victim is put in fear of an attack. ALASKA 
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Since arrest statutes have been broadened, many jurisdictions 
have moved toward mandatory and pro-arrest policies. Under 
these policies, an arrest is either required or preferred if there is 
probable cause to believe that a domestic battery has taken 
place. Although these policies have received mixed reviews, 
the clear trend in police practice is to arrest the batterer at the 
scene, regardless of the victim’s wishes.62 
Almost every other state with a mandatory arrest statute limits 
arrest to assault, battery or violating a stalking protective order. Sixteen 
states, plus the District of Columbia, have mandatory arrest statutes for 
misdemeanor acts of domestic violence.63 Connecticut, the District of 
Columbia, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nevada, Oregon, 
Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Washington limit mandatory arrest to 
assault, battery, or attempted battery.64 Washington further restricts 
mandatory arrest to cases where the suspect is still at the scene of the 
alleged assault.65 Utah mandates misdemeanor arrest only if “the peace 
 
STAT. § 11.41.230 (2009). However, other states continue to separate the two. See, 
e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-23 (defining “menacing” as a situation in which an 
assailant “intentionally places or attempts to place another person in fear of 
imminent serious physical injury”). 
62. Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in 
Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1860 (1996). 
63. AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
ARREST POLICIES BY STATE (2007), available at http://www.abanet.org/domviol/ 
docs/Domestic_Violence_Arrest_Policies_by_State_11_07.pdf  (listing New 
Jersey, Ohio, and Virginia as “Mandatory Arrest?”). Ohio requires arrest only for 
aggravated assaults, an assault involving a deadly weapon, or “serious physical 
harm.” OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.032(A)(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2010). The New 
Jersey mandatory arrest policy was adopted by regulation and appears to be 
limited to felonies.  See Signorile v. City of Perth Amboy, 523 F. Supp. 2d 428, 
433 (D.N.J. 2007) (limiting arrest to cases where the victim exhibits signs of 
injury or where there is probable cause to believe an internal injury exists). 
Virginia’s statute provides that an officer “shall” arrest for a battery “unless 
there are special circumstances which would dictate a course of action other than 
an arrest.” VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-81.3 (West 2010). This seems to provide 
Virginia police with discretion not to arrest. Maine also has a mandatory arrest 
statute limited to felony assault. ME REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 4012(5) (2009). 
64. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38b (2010); D.C. CODE § 16-1031 (2010); 
IOWA CODE § 236.12(2) (2009); id. § 804.7(5); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2307 (2009); id. § 
21-3412(a); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46.2140 (2010); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-3-7 (2009); 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.137 (2009); OR. REV. STAT. § 133.055 (2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 
12-29-3 (2010); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-25-70 (2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-3-2.1 
(2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-2.2 (LexisNexis 2010); WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 10.31.100 (2010).  Nevada’s statute states: “a peace officer shall, unless 
mitigating circumstances exist, arrest a person when [he] has probable cause to 
believe that the person to be arrested has, within the preceding 24 hours, 
committed a battery.” NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.137 (2009) (emphasis added). 
 65. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.99.030 (2010). 
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officer has probable cause to believe that there will be continued 
violence against the alleged victim.”66 New York has a unique arrest 
statute requiring arrest “unless the victim requests otherwise,” only for 
felony domestic violence or violating a restraining order.67 Arizona, New 
Jersey, and South Carolina mandate arrest only if there is physical 
injury.68 Rhode Island, Washington, and Arizona also classify a variety 
of crimes as “domestic” but arrest is limited to assault.69 
Colorado is the only state other than Alaska that mandates arrest 
for crimes that do not involve physical assault (such as criminal 
mischief).  The Colorado statute provides: 
(1) “Domestic violence” means an act or threatened act of 
violence upon a person with whom the actor is or has been 
involved in an intimate relationship. “Domestic violence” also 
includes any other crime against a person, or against property, 
including an animal, or any municipal ordinance violation 
against a person, or against property, including an animal, 
when used as a method of coercion, control, punishment, 
intimidation, or revenge directed against a person with whom 
the actor is or has been involved in an intimate relationship. 
(2) “Intimate relationship” means a relationship between 
spouses, former spouses, past or present unmarried couples, or 
persons who are both the parents of the same child regardless 
of whether the persons have been married or have lived 
together at any time.70 
Although the list of crimes includes property crimes, Colorado does not 
permit arrest for things like harassing phone calls or trespass, as the 
 
66. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-2.2 (LexisNexis 2010). 
67. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10 (Consol. 2010). 
68. Apparently states with mandatory arrest have almost always required 
physical injury.  See Catherine Klein & Leslye Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for 
Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
801, 1150–51 (1993). 
69. R.I. GEN. LAWS. §§ 12-29-2, 3 (2010).  Rhode Island includes vandalism 
and disorderly conduct. Id. In Washington, “‘Domestic violence’ includes but is 
not limited to” assault, reckless endangerment, coercion, burglary, criminal 
trespass, malicious mischief, kidnapping and unlawful imprisonment.  WASH. 
REV. CODE § 10.99.020 (2010).  However, mandatory arrest only applies to 
assault.  Id. § 10.31.100.  It might also be noted that in Washington, as in many 
states, assault requires intent to place the other person in fear of injury whereas 
Alaska’s assault statute includes reckless conduct.  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 13-2904 (2010); id. § 13-3601 (demonstrating that intent is required). 
70. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-800.3 (2010). 
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Alaska statute does.71 In sum, Alaska has a more expansive definition of 
domestic violence than any other state with mandatory arrest. 
C.  Scope of “Family Member” 
In addition to defining “domestic violence” more broadly than 
does any other state, Alaska also classifies more people as “family 
members” for domestic violence purposes than does any other state. The 
Colorado statute, cited above, is fairly typical as it limits domestic 
violence to crimes between “spouses, former spouses, past or present 
unmarried couples, or persons who are both the parents of the same 
child.”72 The Louisiana and South Carolina statutes are almost 
identical—limited to current or former intimate partners.73 
In terms of states with mandatory arrest statutes, most have 
relatively narrow definitions of family member. The District of 
Columbia limits domestic violence to “a person to whom the offender is 
related by blood, adoption, legal custody, marriage, or domestic 
partnership, or with whom the offender has a child in common.”74 Iowa 
limits domestic violence to assault between spouses, separated spouses, 
parents of a minor child, and people who reside together or have 
resided together in the previous year.75 Mississippi limits domestic 
violence to assault between people who have been in a romantic 
relationship or blood relatives who have actually resided together.76 
Nevada’s statute extends to those in a romantic relationship, a blood 
 
71. Coincidentally, the United States Supreme Court commented on the 
Colorado statute in a case litigating whether the state could be sued for failing to 
make an arrest after the suspect had left the area. Town of Castle Rock v. 
Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 763 (2005). Although the arrest policy was not being 
litigated, the Court suggested that the so-called mandatory arrest policy was not 
as strict as it might appear. Id. The Court explained: “Colorado’s restraining-
order statute appears to contemplate . . . that when arrest is impractical—which 
was likely the case when the whereabouts of respondent’s husband were 
unknown—the officers’ statutory duty is to seek a warrant rather than arrest.” 
Id. (citations omitted). 
It would be hazardous to guess the Supreme Court’s view of mandatory 
arrest from the case, but the Court seemed to assume that (at least with regard to 
Colorado law) when a suspect cannot be arrested at the scene of the alleged 
crime that the normal procedure is to seek an arrest warrant. See id. 
72. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-800.3 (2010). 
73. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46.2132 (2010) (amended by 2010 La. Sess. Law Serv. 
Act 861 (H.B. 1467) (West)); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-25-70 (2009). 
74. D.C. CODE § 16-1001 (2010) (not applying to unrelated roommates as 
section 18.66.990 of the Alaska Statutes does). However, there is some question 
how far blood relation extends. 
75. IOWA CODE § 236.2 (2009). 
76. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-7 (2010), amended by 2010 Miss. Laws Ch. 536 (S.B. 
2923). 
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relative, or a current roommate (but not people who once resided 
together).77 The Oregon statute extends to spouses, former spouses, 
parents of a child, people who have cohabited and “[a]dult persons 
related by blood, marriage or adoption.”78 Rhode Island’s statute 
extends to spouses, former spouses, adults related by blood or marriage, 
roommates within the past three years, persons who have a child in 
common, and people who have dated within the past year.79 Utah law 
extends to family and household members but does not appear to define 
these terms, so presumably “household member” would be taken in its 
normal meaning and be limited to current members of the household.80 
Finally, Virginia defines family member to include spouses, former 
spouses, immediate family including grandparents, parents of a 
common child and anyone who has cohabited in the previous twelve 
months.81 
On the other hand, the Alaska statute extends to: 
 
[A]dults or minors who live together or who have lived 
 together . . . adults or minors who are dating or who have dated . . . 
 adults or minors who are engaged in or who have engaged in a 
 sexual relationship, [and] adults or minors who are related to each 
 other up to the fourth degree of consanguinity, whether of the 
 whole or half blood or by adoption.82 
 
 
77. NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.137 (2009). As noted above, Nevada’s statute does 
not quite mandate arrest. 
78. OR. REV. STAT. § 107.705 (LexisNexis 2010). The blood relation is 
potentially expansive, but unlike Alaska’s, the Oregon statute does not extend to 
roommates unless they are cohabiting, which presumably means a sexual 
relationship. The Oregon statute is also unlike that of Alaska in that it does not 
appear to extend to couples in a merely romantic or dating relationship unless 
they actually cohabitate. 
79. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-29-3 (West 2010). This statute is narrower than 
the Alaska statute because of the time limitations on roommates or romantic 
partners. 
80. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-2.1 (West 2010). “Family” is not defined but the 
phrase used in Utah’s statute—“any family or household member”—may 
suggest immediate family members actually residing together.  There does not 
appear to be any case law interpreting the extent of family or household 
member. 
81. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228 (2010). “Cohabit” again appears to be limited 
to those in intimate relationships. As noted above, Virginia should probably not 
be regarded as mandating arrest. See supra note 63. Otherwise, I have limited 
comparison to states with mandatory arrest. 
82. ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990 (2010). 
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Such a broad definition of “family” means that it may be difficult 
even to determine if two people are family members.83 Similarly, there is 
no clear definition of what constitutes a dating or sexual relationship.84 
No other state defines “family member” this broadly for domestic 
violence purposes. Arizona, which has an expansive statute compared to 
most states, extends the definition of domestic violence to people who 
currently or once lived together, or who once had a romantic 
relationship, as well as many relatives.85 However, Arizona’s definition 
is notably unlike that of Alaska in that it does not include aunts, uncles, 
nephews, and cousins unless they have actually resided together. 
Connecticut and Washington have the most expansive definitions 
of “family member” aside from Alaska.  Connecticut law provides: 
“Family or household member” means (A) spouses, former 
spouses; (B) parents and their children; (C) persons eighteen 
years of age or older related by blood or marriage; (D) persons 
sixteen years of age or older other than those persons in 
subparagraph (C) presently residing together or who have 
resided together; (E) persons who have a child in common 
regardless of whether they are or have been married or have 
lived together at any time; and (F) persons in, or have recently 
been in, a dating relationship.86 
This is not as broad as Alaska’s definition, although it includes anyone 
who has ever lived together as an adult. Subsection (C) is potentially 
broader as is includes all adults related by blood, potentially beyond the 
fourth degree of consanguinity, but there must be a cutoff point and it 
seems unlikely the statute is applied to second or third cousins. 
Moreover, unlike Alaska’s statute, Connecticut’s statute does not apply 
to minors under age sixteen. So, for example, two minor siblings 
fighting would be domestic violence in Alaska but not in Connecticut. 
Subsection (F) is also less expansive than in Alaska as it is limited to 
those who have “recently” been in a romantic relationship. 
 
83. Even courts have become confused over the fourth degree of 
consanguinity. Jacko v. State, 981 P.2d 1075, 1077 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999) 
(erroneously ruling that Jacko and another person were sufficiently related 
because they were second cousins when in fact they were first cousins once 
removed). If judges are confused by degrees of consanguinity, how should a law 
enforcement officer “on the beat” decide whom and when they must arrest? 
84. Beth Goldstein Lewis Trimmer, A Sexual Relationship: Did We Have One? 
A Review of the Definition of “Sexual Relationship” Within the Context of Alaska’s 
Domestic Violence Laws, 24 ALASKA L. REV. 23 7 (2007). 
85. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601 (2010). 
86. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38a(2) (2010). 
CLARK_CPCXNS.DOC 12/9/2010  3:37:09 PM 
2010  MANDATORY ARREST FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 169 
Similarly, Washington’s definition of “household member” 
includes: 
spouses, former spouses, persons who have a child in 
common . . . adult persons related by blood or marriage, adult 
persons who are presently residing together or who have 
resided together in the past, . . . persons sixteen years of age or 
older with whom a person sixteen years of age or older has or 
has had a dating relationship, and persons who have a 
biological or legal parent-child relationship.87 
Like Connecticut’s statute, this definition is almost as expansive as 
Alaska’s, but it excludes alleged crimes between minors such as siblings. 
 In short, Alaska is out of the mainstream with respect to both the 
scope of the crimes designated as domestic (and subject to mandatory 
arrest) as well as to the scope of “family members.” Of course, the 
statute’s unique nature does not by itself make it wrong. Perhaps Alaska 
has found a better way, or perhaps Alaska’s unique situation justifies 
radically different policies.  But there are good reasons to take a hard 
look at the statute.  In looking at the expansive definition of domestic 
violence, the Alaska Court of Appeals has expressed dismay at the 
breadth of the definition: 
The apparently expansive scope of “crime involving domestic 
violence” leads to some strange results . . . . For example, if an 
elderly uncle comes to visit his favorite nephew and, while 
lighting his pipe, recklessly scorches a table cloth or a chair, the 
old man has seemingly just committed an act of “domestic 
violence” as defined in [Alaska Statute] 18.66.990(3). That is, the 
uncle has committed the listed offense of criminally negligent 
burning under [Alaska Statute] 11.46.430 (negligently 
damaging the property of another by fire), and the victim is 
related to the perpetrator within the fourth degree of 
consanguinity—thus qualifying them as “household members” 
under [Alaska Statute] 18.66.990(5)(E). 
  Similarly, if a group of former college roommates decide to 
hold a twenty-year reunion at one of their homes, and if one of 
the visiting former roommates gets drunk and recklessly jams 
his friend’s CD player while trying to insert a CD into it, this 
roommate has seemingly just committed an act of “domestic 
violence”. The intoxicated roommate has committed the listed 
offense of fourth-degree criminal mischief under [Alaska 
Statute] 11.46.486(a)(1) (tampering with the property of another 
 
87. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.99.020(3) (2010). 
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with reckless disregard for the risk of harm or loss), and all of 
the former college roommates are “household members” under 
[Alaska Statute] 18.66.990(5)(B).88 
The court was concerned that special rules of evidence that apply to 
domestic violence cases could be misused,89 but the same concern 
certainly applies to the mandatory arrest statute.  It is one thing to speak 
of the need for arrest when a husband is beating his wife and she has no 
other place to go (although even here there is vigorous debate on what 
the best response is in that situation).  But it is hard to see how arrest is 
necessary in either of the examples suggested by the Alaska Court of 
Appeals in Carpentino and Bingaman. Indeed, the remainder of this 
Article argues that mandatory arrest in such situations is not only 
unnecessary, it is likely unconstitutional. 
III. MANDATORY ARREST AND DUE PROCESS CONCERNS 
 One problem with mandatory arrest is that it metes out 
punishment before a suspect has been adjudicated guilty. Many 
proponents of mandatory arrest advocate for it because the measure has 
elements of retribution and deterrence, which are the traditional aims of 
punishment. Indeed, virtually all advocates of mandatory or preferred 
arrest argue that it is a deterrent.90  The seminal Sherman and Berk 
 
88. Carpentino v. State, 42 P.3d 1137, 1141 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002); see also 
Bingaman v. State, 76 P.3d 398, 412 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003) (noting “a person 
who causes a traffic accident through criminal negligence and, by chance, 
happens to injure the child of a former high school sweetheart has committed a 
‘crime involving domestic violence’ as defined in [section 18.66.990 of the Alaska 
Statutes]”). 
89. See Carpentino, 42 P.3d at 1143. For example, Rule 404(b)(4) of the Alaska 
Rules of Evidence permits evidence of prior crimes of domestic violence to be 
introduced subject to a judicial determination that the evidence is not more 
prejudicial than probative. ALASKA R. EVID. 404(b)(4). 
90. See, e.g., Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 
1970–1990, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46, 62 (1992) (“By 1984, the Minneapolis 
police domestic violence experiment was widely cited as proof that arrests had a 
deterrent effect on men who beat their wives.”). “[E]ven if arrest may not deter 
unemployed abusers in ghetto neighborhoods, arrest still deters the vast 
majority of abusers.” Id. at 66. “Even if it turned out that an arrest policy has no 
effect on either the offender or the victim, if it has a deterrent effect on the sons, 
the policy might still be worthwhile, because they are at danger of growing up 
to be abusers themselves.” Id. at 71. Also illustrative is Arthur Rizer’s article on 
mandatory arrest. See Arthur L. Rizer, III, Mandatory Arrest: Do We Need to Take a 
Closer Look?, 36 UWLA L. REV. 1, 15 (2005) (“Another argument made is that if 
punishment is the only objective, mandatory arrest is reasonable.”). Later Rizer 
summarizes: “While there are concerns over the fairness and efficacy of 
mandatory arrest policies, the alternative of allowing suspected abusers to go 
unpunished, with potentially fatal results, is not compelling.” Id. at 26. 
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article was in fact entitled “The Specific Deterrent Effects of Arrest for 
Domestic Assault.”91 While not specifically using the words 
“deterrence,” “retribution,” or “punishment,” other authors leave little 
doubt about their meaning: “Arrest calls the batterer to account for his 
wrong doing in compromising community standards. It apprises him 
that continued violent conduct will be met with severe, adverse 
consequences.”92 
However, the position that warrantless arrest should be used to 
punish suspected batterers is unquestionably unconstitutional.  The 
Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that “punishment” may never be 
imposed except after an adjudication of guilt (that is, either a guilty plea 
or a conviction).93 As the Court explained in Bell v. Wolfish: 
For under the Due Process Clause, a detainee may not be 
punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with 
due process of law.  A person lawfully committed to pretrial 
detention has not been adjudged guilty of any crime. He has 
had only a “judicial determination of probable cause as a 
prerequisite to [the] extended restraint of [his] liberty following 
arrest.” . . . . [T]he Government concededly may detain him to 
ensure his presence at trial and may subject him to the 
restrictions and conditions of the detention facility so long as 
those conditions and restrictions do not amount to punishment, 
or otherwise violate the Constitution.94 
The fundamental principle of justice and of due process is clear: no one 
may ever be punished without first being adjudged guilty through the 
legal process. 
Although mandatory arrest has been widely advocated as a form of 
punishment, this author has found only one article addressing the 
constitutional issues implicated by such a rationale. Almost twenty 
years ago, a group of scholars led by Lawrence Sherman acknowledged 
the problem: 
While the Supreme Court has held that pre-trial detention does 
not legally constitute punishment, the jurisprudence of arrest 
 
91. Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Specific Deterrent Effects of 
Arrest for Domestic Assault, 49 AMER. SOC. REV. 261 (1984). 
92. Barbara J. Hart, Arrest: What’s the Big Deal, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 
207, 208 (1997). 
93. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535–37 (1979); cf. State v. 
Niedermeyer, 14 P.3d 264, 271 (Alaska 2000) (“[T]he state may not impose 
criminal punishment without criminal process.”) (citing Baker v. City of 
Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 401 (Alaska 1970)). 
94. Bell, 441 U.S. at 535–37 (citations omitted). 
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must nonetheless confront problems of potential conflict 
among the diverse objectives of arrest as a sanction. Perhaps 
the most perplexing problem involves empirical evidence of 
conditions under which arrests increase, rather than reduce, the 
frequency of repeat offending by arrested individuals. This 
problem is particularly challenging for misdemeanor offenses 
that rarely result in prosecution and for which arrest may be 
the only criminal sanction ever applied. 
  Mandatory arrest laws for misdemeanor domestic battery 
have become the leading example of this problem in the 
jurisprudence of arrest. Enacted by some fifteen state 
legislatures despite implicit knowledge that few arrests are 
ever prosecuted, mandatory arrest was widely viewed as a 
criminal sanction that produced a specific deterrent effect.95 
The above statement is a credible explanation of the mandatory 
arrest phenomenon.  Sherman was the main author of the Minneapolis 
study, which is credited with being the impetus for the movement 
toward mandatory arrest.96 This makes his opinion that “mandatory 
arrest was widely viewed as a criminal sanction” rather difficult to 
question.97 
 While mandatory arrest is generally considered to be a form of 
punishment, it is a separate question entirely whether or not mandatory 
arrest is “punishment” as a legal matter. If mandatory arrest is 
punishment, then it is likely unconstitutional.  However, the Supreme 
Court has recognized that there is a distinction between measures that 
are punitive and measures that are merely remedial. In Bell, the Court 
identified several factors that work to delineate between punitive and 
remedial sanctions, including: 
[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or 
restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a 
punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of 
scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims 
of punishment—retribution and deterrence, whether the 
behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an 
alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is 
assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to 
 
95. Lawrence W. Sherman et al., The Variable Effects of Arrest on Criminal 
Careers: The Milwaukee Domestic Violence Experiment, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
137, 138 (1992). 
96. See supra note 20. 
97. Sherman et al., supra note 95, at 138. 
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the alternative purpose assigned are all relevant to the inquiry, 
and may often point in differing directions.98 
Therefore, much depends on whether the objectives behind a particular 
measure are retribution and deterrence or something else. The Court 
went on to say: “Retribution and deterrence are not legitimate 
nonpunitive governmental objectives.”99  Rather, retribution and 
deterrence are the “traditional aims of punishment.”100 Accordingly, 
measures that are essentially retributive or deterrent are inappropriate 
prior to a judicial determination of guilt. 
 The Court revealed how this distinction between punishment and 
regulation plays out in Austin v. United States.101 In that case, the Court 
was asked to determine if asset forfeiture was a punitive sanction.102 The 
Government argued that forfeiture was purely remedial because it was 
designed merely to take objects out of circulation, but the Court rejected 
this reasoning.103 It determined that asset forfeiture was punishment, 
despite its obvious remedial effect, because of the “historical 
understanding of forfeiture as punishment” and evidence that Congress 
intended the forfeiture provisions at issue to serve a punitive purpose.104 
From this case, one can say that if a particular measure is purely 
remedial, then it is not punishment. If, on the other hand, a measure 
serves a retributive or deterrent purpose, then that measure is 
“punishment” even if it also has a remedial thrust. 
 The Alaska Supreme Court has applied the same standard. In State 
v. Niedermeyer105 the Alaska Supreme Court was asked to decide whether 
a driver’s license suspension following a citation for underage drinking 
was punitive or regulatory.106 Under the statute in effect at the time, the 
Department of Motor Vehicles was permitted to revoke a person’s 
 
98. Bell, 441 U.S. at 537–38 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 
144, 168–69 (1963)). 
99. Id. at 539 n.20 (quoting Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168). Similarly, the Supreme 
Court of Alaska has held that the Alaska constitution requires criminal sentences 
to address five goals: rehabilitation, isolation, “deterrence of the offender himself 
after his release from confinement . . . as well as deterrence of other members of 
the community who might possess tendencies toward criminal conduct similar 
to that of the offender, and community condemnation of the individual 
offender.”  State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 444 (Alaska 1970). 
 100. Bell, 441 U.S. at 538 (citing Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168). 
 101. 509 U.S. 602 (1993). 
 102. See id. at 604. 
 103. Id. at 620–21. 
 104. Id. at 621–22. 
 105. 14 P.3d 264 (Alaska 2000).  
 106. See id. at 268–72. 
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driver’s license if the person was merely charged with consuming alcohol 
under age.107 
The court ultimately concluded that the statute was 
unconstitutional, explaining, “To revoke a license under circumstances 
amounting to criminal punishment, the state must offer appropriate 
procedural safeguards; as we explained in Baker, the state may not 
impose criminal punishment without criminal process.”108  In reaching 
this conclusion the court discussed both the Austin decision and an 
Alaska Court of Appeals decision (State v. Zerkel109) that determined that 
license suspension for drunk driving was remedial because suspending 
a license bears a direct relationship to the state’s regulatory goal—
removing unsafe drivers from the road: 
Zerkel’s direct-relationship test also fits well with the United 
States Supreme Court’s bright-line view of punitive action. . . . 
The [appeals] court in Zerkel acknowledged that despite the 
direct relationship between drunk driving and the DMV’s 
remedial goal of removing unfit drivers from the road, 
administrative DWI revocations can have a punitive effect that 
deters DWI offenders from committing further offenses. But the 
court deemed this effect to be incidental to the direct, remedial 
effect of the DMV action. Zerkel thus held that administrative 
license revocation for DWI offenses is in essence solely a 
remedial measure.110 
Thus, if a particular measure bears a direct relationship to a regulatory 
objective, then that measure is remedial even though it may also have a 
punitive aspect. In contrast, reducing underage drinking did not bear a 
direct relationship to removing unsafe drivers from the road: 
At most, the minor’s unlawful conduct reflects a possibility of 
increased danger: it suggests that the minor belongs to a class 
of young drivers who generally pose a higher statistical risk 
than other young drivers. Thus, while the behavioral gap 
between underage drinking and unfit driving can be bridged 
by a chain of rational inferences that is strong enough to 
withstand the minimal test of substantive due process, this 
roundabout connection is not the direct and necessary link that 
must exist before an administrative revocation will be 
considered non-punitive. 
 
 107. See id. at 266 n.1. 
 108. Id. at 271 (citing Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 401 (Alaska 
1970)). 
 109. 900 P.2d 744 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995). 
 110. Niedermeyer, 14 P.3d at 269–70 (citations omitted). 
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  In the case at hand, for example, former [Alaska Statute] 
28.15.183 did nothing to tailor its sanction to the specific facts of 
Niedermeyer’s case. There is no case-specific evidence 
suggesting that Niedermeyer, who was arrested in a cabin, 
posed any risk of bad driving—or that he intended to drive at 
all.111 
Niedermeyer provides a framework for understanding whether 
mandatory arrest is remedial or punitive.  If the policy merely serves to 
remove dangerous offenders from a position of threatening alleged 
victims, then it would be simply remedial.  That is, the arrest must be 
essentially remedial and any deterrent effect must be incidental to the 
remedial aspect. However, Alaska’s mandatory arrest statute cannot be 
justified as simply removing dangerous offenders because “domestic 
violence” is defined so broadly under Alaska law. Offenses classified as 
domestic violence do not necessarily bear any direct relationship to an 
ongoing danger; rather, “domestic violence” includes non-violent 
crimes.112 Additionally, the Anchorage study cited above suggests that 
at least a quarter of cases involve no claimed injury whatsoever.113 The 
Hirschel study found that crimes labeled as domestic violence typically 
are less violent than their non-domestic counterpart.114 Additionally, 
Doctor Gelles reports that the extent to which minor acts of domestic 
violence eventually escalate into major acts has been exaggerated.115 
 Furthermore, arrest is not necessary to effect a removal of the 
suspect in every case. The same Anchorage study found that only about 
half of domestic violence occurred between people who actually lived 
together.116 Presumably, the suspect in such cases can be removed by 
measures less drastic than arrest—like simply returning the suspect to 
his own home. Indeed, under the Alaska statute “domestic violence” 
need not even involve a physical presence; a harassing phone call can be 
enough.117 When a phone call is all that is at issue, arrest is not 
absolutely necessary to reduce the threat of immediate physical 
violence. 
 
 111.  Id. at 270. 
 112.  See supra Part II. 
 113.  Municipality of Anchorage, supra note 7, at 17. 
 114.  See Hirschel, et al., supra note 8, at 272 (finding that domestic violence 
cases were more likely than non-domestic violence cases to involve simple 
assault as opposed to aggravated assault and personal weapons as opposed to 
deadly weapons). 
 115.  See Gelles, supra note 32, at 46–47. 
 116.  Municipality of Anchorage, supra note 7, at 16. 
 117.  See ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990(3)(H) (2009). 
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Thus, to paraphrase Niedermeyer, the conduct triggering arrest does 
not directly relate to the arrested person’s need to be separated from the 
alleged victim. And as in Neidermeyer, the arrest statute does “nothing to 
tailor its sanction to the specific facts” of individual cases. The statute 
does not require any “case-specific evidence suggesting that” the person 
arrested “posed any risk.” Moreover, arrest and incarceration are closely 
connected with criminal penalties. Therefore, applying the Neidermeyer 
and Austin analysis to the mandatory arrest statute, it appears the 
statute qualifies as punitive and not remedial. 
A mandatory arrest policy for any “domestic violence” crime, 
including non-violent offenses (such as harassing phone calls) and 
where there is no realistic possibility of violence, does not appear 
tailored toward protecting vulnerable victims. It appears much more 
likely directed at precisely what many advocates of mandatory arrest 
say it is designed to do—assure quick and severe sanctions to abusers.  
That makes mandatory arrest unconstitutional because it provides penal 
sanction without due process. 
IV. WARRANTLESS ARREST AND EQUAL PROTECTION 
A second problem with mandatory arrest for domestic violence 
suspects is that it violates the requirement for equal protection of the 
law.  Most early advocates of preferred or mandatory arrest simply 
asked that family violence not be treated as less serious than the same 
crime committed between strangers.118 Professor Hanna wrote: “[W]e 
should be cautious not to treat victims of domestic violence differently 
than we would treat victims of other crimes.”119 That is a pretty 
compelling argument as far as it goes.  It is a simple demand for equal 
justice: treat a domestic dispute in the same way that the dispute would 
be treated if it were between strangers. 
But what began as a demand to treat all cases the same has now led 
to profoundly unequal treatment. A person suspected of committing any 
of the long list of domestic violence crimes must be arrested, whereas a 
non-domestic suspect could not be arrested without a warrant—and 
likely would never be arrested at all. A suspect in a case classified as 
domestic will be held without bail while an ordinary suspect would be 
released on bail.120 If released, a suspect in a domestic case is subject to 
more onerous conditions of release121 and if tried, subject to entirely 
 
 118.  See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 18, at 4. 
 119.  Hanna, supra note 62, at 1890. 
 120.  See ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.027(e) (2009). 
 121.  See, e.g., id. § 12.30.027(b). 
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different rules of evidence which permit the jury to hear about prior 
crimes.122 Finally, the defendant may be subject to heightened 
punishment if convicted and may face a variety of civil penalties.123 
Sections 12.25.030(b) and 18.65.530 of the Alaska Statutes single out 
a certain group of people for arrest when similarly situated individuals 
could not be arrested. For example, if John Smith is alleged to have 
slapped his neighbor and the assault did not occur in the presence of 
police, Smith may not be arrested without the police obtaining a warrant 
from a neutral and detached magistrate. (In practice few police officers 
would seek a warrant for a misdemeanor so likely there would be no 
arrest at all.) However, if Smith is alleged to have slapped his former 
roommate, the statute permits (or if less than twelve hours have elapsed, 
requires) police to arrest him without a warrant.124 This divergent 
treatment of people accused of identical conduct likely violates Alaska’s 
guarantee of “equal rights, opportunities, and protection under the 
law.”125 
“Equal protection ensures that the State will not treat an individual 
or group of individuals differently from all other individuals.”126 As the 
supreme court explained in striking down another provision of the 
domestic violence statutes in Williams v. State: 
Article I, section 1 of the Alaska Constitution provides that all 
persons are “entitled to equal rights, opportunities, and 
protection under the law.” In evaluating whether legislation 
violates this guarantee, we apply a flexible three-part test that 
is dependent on the importance of the rights involved: 
 
 122. Compare ALASKA R. EVID. 404(b)(4) (permitting evidence of prior domestic 
violence crimes to be admitted in prosecution for domestic violence crime) with 
ALASKA R. EVID. 404(b)(1) (generally not permitting evidence of prior crimes to 
be admitted). 
 123. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(g) (stating that parent with history of 
domestic violence is presumed unfit for sole custody of child). 
 124. See id. § 18.65.530(a). 
 125. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 1. The arrest statute is probably unconstitutional 
under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution as well. The 
Alaska Court of Appeals in Williams v. State, 151 P.3d 460 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006), 
did not need to address the federal constitution because it found a violation of 
the Alaska Constitution. The argument could be applied to mandatory arrest 
statutes in other states, but given that those statutes are more narrowly tailored 
than the Alaska statute, some of them might be more likely to pass constitutional 
muster.  Perhaps the strongest argument that the Alaska statute is not narrowly 
tailored is that every other state in the union has a narrower statute.  Because the 
statute discriminates against a broad class of suspects and is not narrowly 
tailored to a compelling state interest, the statute is likely unconstitutional. 
 126.  State v. Murtagh, 169 P.3d 602, 607 (Alaska 2007) (quoting Weidner v. 
State, Dep’t of Transp. & Pub. Facilities, 860 P.2d 1205, 1211 (Alaska 1993)). 
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First, it must be determined at the outset what weight 
should be afforded the constitutional interest impaired by 
the challenged enactment. . . . 
Second, an examination must be undertaken of the 
purposes served by the challenged statute. . . . 
Third, an evaluation of the state’s interest in the particular 
means employed to further its goals must be undertaken. 
Once again, the state’s burden will differ in accordance 
with the determination of the level of scrutiny under the 
first stage of analysis. At the low end of the sliding scale, 
we have held that a substantial relationship between 
means and ends is constitutionally adequate. At the higher 
end of the scale, the fit between means and ends must be 
much closer. If the purpose can be accomplished by a less 
restrictive alternative, the classification will be 
invalidated.127 
When the classification affects fundamental rights, it is subject to 
strict scrutiny.128 
Williams v. State held that another provision of the Domestic 
Violence Prevention and Victim Protection Act of 1996 violated equal 
protection.129 Williams was charged with misdemeanor assault for 
allegedly throwing his wife to the ground.130 As a condition of his 
release, the court ordered that he not reside in the family home.131  
Weeks later, the defendant and his wife then asked the judge to permit 
him to move back by dropping the condition of release; although the 
State did not oppose the request, the trial court refused, citing the 
statute’s requirements.132  Williams appealed, contending that the statute 
violated equal protection guarantees by “infringing [upon] the liberty 
interests of persons who pose no threat of future violence.”133 
Prosecutors countered that there was no equal protection problem 
 
 127. Williams, 151 P.3d at 464 (quoting Alaska Pac. Assurance Co. v. Brown, 
687 P.2d 264, 269–70 (Alaska 1984)). 
 128.  Pub. Emp. Ret. Sys. v. Gallant, 153 P.3d 346, 349–50 (Alaska 2007) 
(“[W]hen a classification is based on a suspect factor . . . or infringes on 
fundamental rights . . . a classification will be upheld only when the enactment 
furthers a ‘compelling state interest’ and the enactment is ‘necessary’ to the 
achievement of that interest.”); see also Peloza v. Freas, 871 P.2d 687, 690 & n.6 
(Alaska 1994) (citing State v. Cosio, 858 P.2d 621, 626 (Alaska 1993) (noting that 
under federal law legal classifications affecting fundamental rights are subject to 
strict scrutiny)). 
 129. Williams, 151 P.3d at 468. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 462–63. 
 133. Id. at 464 (citations omitted). 
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because the statute treated all persons on release for charges of domestic 
violence the same.134 The court rejected the State’s argument.135 
It began by recognizing that there was a fundamental liberty 
interest at play in the case and held that: “Williams has an important, if 
not fundamental, right to live in his home with his wife and family 
while on pre-trial release, and that any state infringement of that right 
must be carefully scrutinized.”136 
While the State had argued that a blanket prohibition on returning 
to the alleged victim’s residence was necessary because of “the peculiar 
dynamics of domestic violence—in particular, the well-documented 
tendency of victims to remain with their abusers,”137 the court found this 
interest insufficient to justify the statute’s rigid requirements.138 It 
explained: 
[B]ecause of the broad definition of “a crime involving 
domestic violence,” there is a substantial risk that the statute 
will burden the liberty interests of persons who pose no 
appreciable risk of future violence. . . . 
  [U]nder Alaska’s far-reaching definition of domestic 
violence, probable cause to believe a person has committed a 
domestic violence offense cannot necessarily be equated with 
probable cause to believe that the person poses an ongoing risk 
to the alleged victim’s safety.139 
Similarly, the court further criticized the State’s argument that such 
measures were necessary by pointing out that no other state had such a 
far reaching statute.140 
 Ultimately, the court concluded that the statute did violate the 
state’s equal protection provision because it covered those arrested for 
domestic violence who posed “no appreciable risk of assaulting the 
victim or tampering with the victim’s testimony.”141 
Virtually everything the court said about the statute in the context 
of the “do not return to residence” provision is directly applicable to the 
mandatory arrest provision.  First, Williams established that those subject 
to the domestic violence statutes and those who are not, sets up an equal 
protection problem because it treats similarly situated persons 
 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 465. 
    137.  Id. at 466. 
 138. See id. at 467–68. 
 139. Id. (citations omitted). 
 140. Id. at  468–69 (citations omitted). 
    141.  Id. at 469–70. 
CLARK_CPCXNS.DOC 12/9/2010  3:37:09 PM 
180 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [27:2 
differently. Second, there is little doubt that the right to be free from 
unreasonable seizure of one’s person through warrantless arrest is at 
least as fundamental as the right to chose one’s living accommodations. 
Third, because the arrest statute requires the arrest of “all persons 
charged with crimes that meet the broad definition of domestic 
violence . . . even persons who pose no appreciable risk of assaulting the 
victim or tampering with the victim’s testimony” it too is 
“impermissibly overinclusive.” No other state requires mandatory arrest 
as broadly as does Alaska; indeed, Alaska’s statute goes even further 
than the Model Code on which it was supposedly based. 
Moreover, as in Williams, the arrest statute is not narrowly tailored 
to any existing dangers.  The arrest statute applies to people who do not 
live together and to people who may not even reside in the same city. A 
person in Nome could make a harassing phone call to a family member 
in Ketchikan and be subject to warrantless arrest. Williams cautioned 
that “because of the broad definition of ‘a crime involving domestic 
violence,’ there is a substantial risk that the statute will burden the 
liberty interests of persons who pose no appreciable risk of future 
violence.”142 That warning applies with no less force to Alaska’s 
mandatory arrest statute; that statute also requires the warrantless arrest 
of people who pose no appreciable risk of future violence. 
Furthermore, the coverage of the “arrest and hold” statute is even 
broader than the coverage of the “do not return to residence” 
requirement. At least that statute was limited to those who reside 
together, but the mandatory-arrest-and-hold-overnight provision 
applies to everyone charged with a domestic violence offense—even 
those who do not reside with the alleged victim. Thus, the arrest statute 
appears to be even harder to justify than the no-return statute. 
V. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON ARREST 
In the sections above it was argued that Alaska’s mandatory arrest 
statute was facially unconstitutional because it violates due process and 
equal protection.  The following section will discuss ways in which the 
arrest statute may be unconstitutional as applied in specific 
circumstances.143 That is, a particular mandatory arrest is likely to be 
 
 142. Id. at 467. 
 143. Courts typically distinguish two ways a statute may be unconstitutional.  
The entire statute may be “facially unconstitutional” because it can never be 
applied in a constitutional way, or a statute may be unconstitutional as applied 
in particular cases. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (stating that 
a statute is facially unconstitutional when there are no circumstances under 
which it would be valid); see also Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican 
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unconstitutional in two common situations: when the warrantless arrest 
occurs in the suspect’s home and when the domestic violence incident 
has not occurred in the presence of police. 
A.  Warrantless Arrest in the Suspect’s Home 
1. Arrest Following Nonconsensual Entry 
 
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable 
searches and seizures.144 These protections against unreasonable 
searches and seizures are strongest in a person’s own home, and 
searches inside the home are presumptively unreasonable.145 In Kirk v. 
Louisiana,146 for example, police observed what appeared to be several 
drug purchases occurring in a home; fearing potential loss of evidence, 
they entered the home without a warrant and arrested the defendant.147 
The Court held that this arrest and seizure of evidence was 
unconstitutional.148 Relying on Payton v. New York, the Court held that 
the special Fourth Amendment protections for one’s home mandated 
that “exigent circumstances” were prerequisites for a warrantless arrest 
in the home; the Court found such circumstances lacking in Kirk.149 
Similarly, in Welsh v. Wisconsin150 the Supreme Court held that 
arresting the suspect in his home for a traffic infraction was 
unconstitutional absent a warrant or exigent circumstances.151 In that 
case, witnesses had observed the suspect driving erratically, and when 
the police later found him in bed at home, they arrested him for driving 
under the influence.152 Noting that warrantless seizures inside the home 
were presumptively unreasonable, the Court held that this arrest was 
unconstitutional because the “exigent circumstances” bar was almost 
impossible to meet when the resulting arrest was for only a minor 
offense.153 
 
Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008) (“[A] facial challenge must fail where the statute 
has a plainly legitimate sweep.”) (Internal quotation marks omitted). 
 144. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 145. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980). 
 146. 536 U.S. 635 (2002). 
 147. Id. at 636. 
 148. See id. at 637. 
 149. Id. at 637–638 
 150. 466 U.S. 740 (1984). 
 151. Id. at 753. 
 152. Id. at 742–43. 
 153. Id. at 749–50 (quoting Payton, 445 U.S. at 586). Interestingly, in a pair of 
footnotes the Court suggested that the constitution may require “an absolute ban 
on warrantless home arrests for certain minor offenses” but left the question 
undecided. See id. at 750, nn. 11–12. 
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The Welsh Court also in dicta rejected the converse of its holding, 
stating that “no exigency is created simply because there is probable 
cause to believe that a serious crime has been committed.”154  That is, 
exigent circumstances do not exist merely because the crime is a serious 
one.  Thus, the fact that domestic violence may be a more serious crime 
than the violation in Welsh does not suggest that exigent circumstances 
should more readily be found. Some commentators have urged a 
different view, however. For example, Professors Klein and Orloff 
argue: 
Warrantless arrests are proper when the arrest needs to be 
made immediately due to the seriousness of the crime, or the 
presence of danger to the victim or the police officers. In 
domestic violence cases, warrantless arrests are appropriate 
because requiring the police to leave the abuse victim with the 
batterer in order to go and obtain a warrant would likely 
subject the victim to further violence.155 
It is true that when there is an emergency requiring an immediate 
response, a warrantless arrest can be made.  However, as a legal matter, 
Klein and Orloff’s statement is problematic as applied to Alaska’s 
statute in a few ways.  In the first place, as noted above, the Supreme 
Court has said that “no exigency is created simply because there is 
probable cause to believe that a serious crime has been committed.”156 
Whether exigent circumstances exist depends not on whether the 
offence is serious but rather on whether there is an ongoing danger 
requiring an immediate response, rising to the level of “exigent 
circumstances.”157 Secondly, Klein and Orloff assume that domestic 
violence means assault because that is how almost all states classify 
domestic violence. In Alaska, however, the statute includes non-violent 
crimes; accordingly, exigent circumstances must be justified on a case by 
case basis. Neither courts nor police can simply assume that every 
domestic violence crime creates an exigency requiring warrantless 
arrest.158 
 
 154. Id. at 753. 
 155. Klein & Orloff, supra note 68, at 1148 (citations omitted). 
 156. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753. 
 157. Of course, it is a false dichotomy that the only two options are immediate 
arrest or leaving the alleged victim alone with the alleged batterer.  Police have 
numerous other options, such as taking the alleged victim to the station, 
transporting her to a family member’s or friend’s house, leaving an officer at the 
scene while a second applies for the warrant, asking the suspect to voluntarily 
leave the home, and so forth.  And obviously in many cases the alleged victim 
and the suspect will not reside together at all. 
 158. See Beltz v. State, 221 P.3d 328, 336 n.42 (Alaska 2009) (“Determining 
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Occasionally commentators suggest that warrantless arrest may be 
needed in domestic violence cases because such cases are particularly 
dangerous to the alleged victims as well as to investigating officers.159 
Klein and Orloff seem to suggest as much, and courts occasionally 
embrace the theory that domestic disputes are more dangerous than 
non-domestic ones.160 But statistics simply do not bear out this 
argument. As one writer noted in surveying police arrest statistics: 
“while domestic violence incidents account for 30% of all police calls, 
they are responsible for only 5.7% of police deaths. Thus, making 
domestic disturbances one of the least dangerous of police activities.”161 
More analysis comparing domestic versus non-domestic crimes of the 
same nature would undoubtedly be helpful, but such an analysis is 
beyond the scope of this Article. Of course, domestic assaults can be 
very serious, and domestic violence is a real problem.  Nevertheless, any 
attempt to justify mandatory arrest based on the theory that domestic 
incidents are more violent than the same offense committed between 
strangers is not supported by the current statistical evidence. 
2.  Arrest Following Consensual Entry 
 
One other issue to note is consensual entry by police. Some courts 
and commentators interpret the Payton, Welsh, and Kirk cases as making 
only the entry into the home illegal.  In other words, if police were to 
enter the home legally (for example, if they knock on the door and ask, 
“May we come inside to talk?”), then they may constitutionally arrest a 
person in his own home without a warrant. The Illinois Court of 
Appeals has apparently adopted this position. In a recent case, that court 
held that “once the officers were granted access by voluntary consent to 
the apartment, no warrant of any type was required to arrest the 
defendant on the probable cause the police clearly had amassed up to 
that point.”162 
 
whether exigent circumstances exist is a fact-specific inquiry.”). 
 159. See Klein & Orloff, supra note 68, at 1148 (“Warrantless arrests are 
proper . . . due to . . . the presence of danger to the victim or the police officers.”). 
 160. See, e.g., People v. Castillo, No. H023874, 2003 WL 193448, at *7 & n.2 
(Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2003) (“[T]he escalating pattern of violence present in 
many cases of domestic violence suggests to us that such an offense should be 
perceived as more dangerous than the same crime in other situations.”). 
 161. Jessica Dayton, The Silencing of a Woman’s Choice: Mandatory Arrest and No 
Drop Prosecution Policies in Domestic Violence Cases, 9 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 281, 
284 (2003). 
 162. People v. Adams, 914 N.E.2d 490, 498–99 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009). 
Unfortunately, the decision provides almost no argument explaining this 
position. It cites an earlier Illinois case People v. Williams, 891 N.E.2d 904, 926, (Ill. 
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The position that “once inside” no arrest warrant is needed is 
incompatible with Supreme Court precedent. Part of the confusion 
seems to stem from Steagald v. United States,163 which stated that “absent 
exigent circumstances or consent, an entry into a private dwelling to 
conduct a search or effect an arrest is unreasonable without a 
warrant.”164  In this statement, the Court was merely noting that an 
owner of a residence may ask the police to come inside his residence and 
arrest a visitor—this was the consent the case discussed.165 
In explaining the law in Welsh the United States Supreme Court 
noted explicitly that the Constitution protects against both warrantless 
entry and warrantless arrest in the home: 
It is axiomatic that the “physical entry of the home is the chief 
evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is 
directed.” . . . It is not surprising, therefore, that the Court has 
recognized, as “a ‘basic principle of Fourth Amendment law[,]’ 
that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are 
presumptively unreasonable.” 
  Consistently with these long-recognized principles, the 
Court decided in Payton v. New York, that warrantless felony 
arrests in the home are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, 
absent probable cause and exigent circumstances.166 
While it is true that the Court speaks of physical entry as “the chief 
evil,” the language leaves no question that “warrantless felony arrests in 
the home are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, absent probable 
cause and exigent circumstances.”167 These statements plainly indicate 
that warrantless arrest is unconstitutional whether or not preceded by a 
warrantless entry. 
Additionally, it makes sense to think that authorization to enter is 
different than authorization to make an arrest. Of course, residents can 
allow police to enter to arrest a non-resident, and suspects may 
voluntarily surrender. But normally, when police are admitted they 
 
App. Ct. 2008), which in turn cites Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).  
Williams apparently interpreted Payton to prohibit warrantless entry only. See 
Williams, 891 N.E.2d at 926. 
 163. 451 U.S. 204 (1981). 
 164. Id. at 214 n.7. 
 165. This is also how lower courts have interpreted Steagald. See, e.g., Guerrero 
v. Deane, No. 1:09cv1313, 2010 WL 670089, at *6 (E.D. Va. Feb. 19, 2010) (“Thus, 
the Court finds the Supreme Court's holding in Steagald v. United States—that a 
law enforcement officer may not enter a third-party residence to effectuate a 
subject's arrest without a search warrant, consent of the owner of the residence, 
or exigent circumstances—to be more fitting here.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 166. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748–49 (1984) (citations omitted). 
 167. Id. 
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must adhere to the scope of the consent.168 And as the Court reasoned in 
Florida v. Jimeno, “[t]he standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s 
consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of ‘objective’ 
reasonableness—what would the typical reasonable person have 
understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?”169  A 
reasonable person would not think that permitting an officer inside the 
door to talk was an agreement to search or seize his own person. 
The Alaska Court of Appeals dealt with the scope-of-consent issue 
similarly in Haskins v. Municipality of Anchorage.170 Police went to Mr. 
Haskins’s residence to investigate a recent hit-and-run accident.171 
Officers asked Ms. Haskins if they could speak to her husband, and Ms. 
Haskins told the officers to come into the entryway of her home.172 But 
when Ms. Haskins went downstairs to get her husband, the police 
followed her and discovered Mr. Haskins in a downstairs bedroom.173 
Holding that the search and seizure of Mr. Haskins was 
unconstitutional, the court explained that “even though Ms. Haskins 
knew that the police had come to speak to her husband, she only gave 
the officers permission to come in and wait while she fetched him. That 
limited consent constituted the boundary of the officers’ freedom within 
the house.”174 
 Haskins did not address whether police could have seized Mr. 
Haskins if he had allowed police into the entry to talk to him.  
Nevertheless, the statement that the “limited consent constituted the 
boundary of the officers’ freedom” suggests that the court was thinking 
not just in terms of the officers’ physical location but also in terms of 
their freedom of action.  If the consent was “to talk” then that is all they 
were free to do.  As the California Court of Appeal has explained: 
It is established law that the police may not justify a 
warrantless arrest if the limits of the consent to enter a home 
have been exceeded. A police officer’s right to enter is limited 
to the scope of the consent. A consent to enter for the purpose 
 
 168. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251–52 (1991) (“The scope of a search is 
generally defined by its expressed object. . . . A suspect may of course delimit as 
he chooses the scope of the search to which he consents.”); see also 4 WAYNE R. 
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, § 8.1(c), at 
32–33 (4th ed. 2004) (“[I]t goes without saying that a consent to search a vehicle 
does not also constitute a consent to search the person of the individual giving 
the consent[.]”). 
 169. Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251 (citations omitted). 
 170. 22 P.3d 31 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001). 
 171. Id. at 32. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 32–33. 
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of talking with a suspect is not a consent to enter for the 
purpose of making an arrest of the suspect.175 
This reasoning is compelling.  It is hard to see how a person could be 
stripped of his right to be free from warrantless seizure simply by 
agreeing to let police step inside his door. 
This issue is particularly important in the context of domestic 
violence because such cases will often involve co-tenants—who may 
have very different ideas at the moment about the extent to which police 
should be admitted into the home. With respect to whether a co-tenant 
can consent to have another tenant arrested, the Court has long held that 
co-tenants only have authority over common areas or common property.  
The Supreme Court recently summarized the law in Georgia v. 
Randolph176: 
The Fourth Amendment recognizes a valid warrantless entry 
and search of premises when police obtain the voluntary 
consent of an occupant who shares, or is reasonably believed to 
share, authority over the area in common with a co-occupant 
who later objects to the use of evidence so obtained. . . . [A] 
physically present inhabitant’s express refusal of consent to a 
police search is dispositive as to him, regardless of the consent 
of a fellow occupant.177 
In short, Randolph primarily addressed what happens when one resident 
says, “You may come in,” but the second resident says, “No, you may 
not.” Randolph held that consent of one resident to entry does not permit 
police to enter a residence over the objection of a co-tenant (at least 
when the co-tenant is present at the scene).178 Obviously this has direct 
application when one spouse says, “Come in and arrest my spouse” and 
the other spouse objects to being arrested. But what happens if the non-
consenting spouse does not actively object, or does not object until he or 
she sees the police come inside? 
 The reasoning of Randolph indicates that the non-consenting 
resident may object at any time. The Court looked to social expectations 
and concluded that when one co-tenant does not want visitors, the 
objecting tenant’s wishes normally would be respected: 
To begin with, it is fair to say that a caller standing at the door 
of shared premises would have no confidence that one 
occupant’s invitation was a sufficiently good reason to enter 
 
 175. In re Johnny V., 149 Cal. Rptr. 180, 186 (Ct. App. 1978). 
 176. 547 U.S. 103 (2006). 
 177. Id. at 106. 
 178. Id. at 122–23. 
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when a fellow tenant stood there saying, “stay out.” Without 
some very good reason, no sensible person would go inside 
under those conditions.179 
The Court went on to explain: 
[T]he “right” to admit the police . . . is not an enduring and 
enforceable ownership right as understood by the private law 
of property, but is instead the authority recognized by 
customary social usage as having a substantial bearing on 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness in specific circumstances.180 
Take a slightly different scenario: suppose one tenant says to a 
police officer “come in” and three seconds later another tenant walks 
into the room and says “get out.” Can the police at that point say, “Too 
late, I’m already inside”?  In other words, can a co-tentant say “stay out” 
but not “get out”?  It is hard to see much logical or legal distinction 
between “get out” and “stay out.” A visitor who refuses to leave when 
asked is a trespasser just as much as a person who came in uninvited.181  
To illustrate this further suppose both residents ask the police to leave. 
The Alaska Court of Appeals has noted, “[o]f course, an individual may 
withdraw or limit their [sic] consent to a search at any time before the 
search is completed, by either a verbal or physical act indicating that the 
consent has been withdrawn.”182 Police have no right to continue 
searching when the person who initially gave consent also withdraws 
that consent. So there really is no difference between “stay out” and “get 
out”; a resident who has a legal right to say “stay out” has the same 
legal right to say “get out.” Unless there are exigent circumstances to 
justify staying (at which point the presence is no longer based on 
consent), police would need to leave.183 
 
 179. Id. at 113. 
 180. Id. at 120–21. 
 181. Trespassing occurs when people unlawfully enter or remain on a 
premise, ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.330 (2010), which is defined as “enter[ing] or 
remain[ing] in or upon premises . . . when the premises . . . at the time of the 
entry or remaining, is not open to the public,” ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.350 (2010). 
There is one sentence in Randolph which suggests that the moment of entry into 
the residence is all that matters: “if a potential defendant with self-interest in 
objecting is in fact at the door and objects, the co-tenant's permission does not 
suffice for a reasonable search, whereas the potential objector, nearby but not 
invited to take part in the threshold colloquy, loses out.” Randolph, 547 U.S. at 
105. It seems unlikely the Court meant that police may continue to rely on 
consent of a resident when the other specifically says “get out.” 
 182. Baxter v. State, 77 P.3d 19, 25 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003) (citations omitted). 
 183. Before leaving Randolph there is one other interesting colloquy in the 
opinion involving the application to domestic violence investigations. The 
dissent suggested that the decision meant police cannot enter a residence if they 
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In short, the sort of warrantless arrest that is required by Alaska’s 
domestic violence statute appears unconstitutional if that arrest is 
effected in the suspect’s home.  Although a few courts have held that the 
Constitution protects only against involuntary entry and that once 
inside police may arrest without a warrant, that position seems contrary 
to well-established Supreme Court precedent and a common sense 
understanding of the limits of consent. 
B. Domestic Violence Incidents Not Occurring in the Presence of 
Police 
 1. Warrantless Arrest and the Fourth Amendment 
 
It remains an open question whether it is ever constitutional for 
police to arrest a person for a minor offense that was not witnessed by 
police.184 Under English law as far back as 1710 the rule was that “a 
constable cannot arrest, but when he sees an actual breach of the peace; 
and if the affray be over, he cannot arrest.”185  This law was based on the 
recognition that arrest is a significant interference in the liberty of 
citizens and that unless an immediate danger required intervention, an 
arrest warrant should be obtained.186 
In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has held that 
warrantless arrest for misdemeanor is not limited to breaches of the 
peace, but the Court has suggested (without actually deciding the issue) 
that the “in the presence” requirement is a constitutional necessity.  In 
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,187 the Court by a five to four majority held 
that: “If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has 
 
receive a report of domestic violence and one of the residents refuses to let the 
police enter. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 139–40. But the majority opinion explained 
that Randolph was about the limits of consent, and that police are permitted to 
enter, without anyone’s consent, when there are exigent circumstances that 
demand immediate response. Id. at 117–19. 
 184.  The argument in this section is not particularly original, as numerous 
scholars have argued that misdemeanor arrest without exigent circumstances is 
unconstitutional. See, e.g., Thomas R. Folk, The Case for Constitutional Constraints 
upon the Power to Make Full Custody Arrests, 48 U. CIN. L. REV. 321 (1979); Barbara 
C. Salken, The General Warrant of the Twentieth Century? A Fourth Amendment 
Solution to Unchecked Discretion to Arrest for Traffic Offenses, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 221 
(1989); Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 257 (1984). 
   185.  See William A. Schroeder, Warrantless Misdemeanor Arrests and the Fourth 
Amendment, 58 MO. L. REV. 771, 788  (1993) (quoting Regina v. Tooley, 92 Eng. 
Rep. 349, 352 (1710)). 
 186. Id. at 788–89. 
 187. 532 U.S. 318 (2001). 
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committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, 
without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.”188 
In Atwater, the petitioner argued that her arrest for not wearing a 
seatbelt was an “unreasonable seizure” because traditionally arrests for 
misdemeanors were only permitted if committed in the presence of the 
officer and constituted a “breach of the peace.”189 Although the seatbelt 
violation was witnessed by the officer, Atwater argued that she should 
not have been arrested unless the offense constituted a “breach of the 
peace.”190 The Court, however, held that a “breach of the peace” was not 
constitutionally required for the arrest.191 
But would arrest for a minor offense not committed in the presence 
of an officer be constitutional?  Atwater noted this issue but explicitly 
refused to resolve it: “We need not, and thus do not, speculate whether 
the Fourth Amendment entails an ‘in the presence’ requirement for 
purposes of misdemeanor arrests.”192  It should be noted, however, that 
the Court’s authorities all incorporated the “in the presence” 
requirement: 
Although the Court has not had much to say about warrantless 
misdemeanor arrest authority, what little we have said tends to 
cut against Atwater’s argument. In discussing this authority, 
we have focused on the circumstance that an offense was 
committed in an officer’s presence, to the omission of any 
reference to a breach-of-the-peace limitation.193 
Thus, even though Atwater declined to address whether the “in the 
presence” requirement was of constitutional dimension, the Court has 
repeatedly emphasized that misdemeanor arrest is permitted when 
there is probable cause of a felony or of a misdemeanor committed in 
 
 188. Id. at 354 (emphasis added). In Virginia v. Moore the Supreme Court 
confirmed that “[w]hen officers have probable cause to believe that a person has 
committed a crime in their presence, the Fourth Amendment permits them to 
make an arrest, and to search the suspect in order to safeguard evidence and 
ensure their own safety.” Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 178 (2008) (emphasis 
added). Moore does not seem to have added much to the law in this area 
although the decision did note three justifications for arrest: “arrest will still 
ensure a suspect’s appearance at trial, prevent him from continuing his offense, 
and enable officers to investigate the incident more thoroughly.” Id. at 174. 
 189. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 325–26. 
 190. See id. 
 191. Id. at 329 (“In Carroll . . . we conspicuously omitted any reference to a 
breach-of-the-peace limitation in stating that the ‘usual rule’ at common law was 
that “a police officer [could] arrest without warrant . . . one guilty of a 
misdemeanor if committed in his presence.”). 
 192. Id. at 341 n.11. 
 193. Id. at 340–41 (citations omitted). 
CLARK_CPCXNS.DOC 12/9/2010  3:37:09 PM 
190 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [27:2 
the presence of police. For example, to quote Carroll, the case relied on 
by the Court in Atwater: “The usual rule is that a police officer may 
arrest without warrant one believed by the officer upon reasonable 
cause to have been guilty of a felony, and that he may only arrest 
without a warrant one guilty of a misdemeanor if committed in his 
presence.”194 While the Court dispenses with the “breach of the peace” 
language in Carroll, it retains the “presence” requirement; although the 
Court did not specifically consider the issue in Atwater, the distinction 
suggests the “presence” requirement is necessary in a way that the 
“breach of the peace” requirement is not. 
Moreover, Atwater attached an Appendix to the decision that lists 
the arrest statutes from all fifty states. The Appendix indicated that 
almost every state, at the time, permitted warrantless misdemeanor 
arrest so long as the misdemeanor occurred in the presence of police.195  
According to the Atwater Appendix, every state had an “in the presence” 
requirement but Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Montana, 
and Wisconsin.196  In addition Rhode Island appears to permit arrest not 
in the presence of an officer, but the Rhode Island statute reads 
(according to the Atwater Appendix) “for misdemeanors and petty 
misdemeanors where ‘[t]he officer has reasonable grounds to believe 
that [the] person cannot be arrested later, or [m]ay cause injury to 
himself or herself or others or loss or damage to property unless 
immediately arrested.’”197 So although the Supreme Court refused to 
address this issue, both Supreme Court precedent and the vast majority 
of state laws have historically permitted arrest for misdemeanor offenses 
only when committed in the presence of police. Under the analysis 
applied in Atwater, the logical conclusion is that misdemeanors not 
committed in the presence of police are not arrestable offenses under the 
constitution, because “in the presence” has a much longer and stronger 
pedigree than the “breach of the peace” requirement. 
 Furthermore, the Court in Atwater was concerned that it would be 
impossible to draw a clear line between minor offenses, which would 
not justify arrest, and serious ones, which would.  However, this 
rationale does not apply as strongly in the context of the “presence” 
requirement because the line between offenses that are committed in the 
presence of an officer and those that are not is an easier line to draw. 
In the end Atwater was upheld by a bare majority in a five to four 
vote with a strong dissent written by Justice O’Connor: 
 
 194. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156–57 (1997). 
 195. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 355–60 (2001). 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 359. 
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The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free from 
“unreasonable searches and seizures.” The Court recognizes 
that the arrest of Gail Atwater was a “pointless indignity” that 
served no discernible state interest, ante, at 1553, and yet holds 
that her arrest was constitutionally permissible. Because the 
Court’s position is inconsistent with the explicit guarantee of 
the Fourth Amendment, I dissent.198 
Indeed, the majority opinion itself conceded: “Atwater might well 
prevail under a rule derived exclusively to address the uncontested facts 
of her case, since her claim to live free of pointless indignity and 
confinement clearly outweighs anything the City can raise against it 
specific to her.”199 Given the strong dissent and close vote, it seems 
unlikely that the Supreme Court would permit warrantless arrest for a 
misdemeanor not committed in the presence of officers—particularly 
since it appears that a stronger case can be made that the “presence” 
requirement has more to recommend it.  Indeed, in his article Warrantless 
Misdemeanor Arrests and the Fourth Amendment, William Schroeder 
argues: “The justifications that the Supreme Court has given for 
dispensing with the warrant requirement suggest that absent exigent 
circumstances, the Constitution requires a warrant when an arrest is 
made for a misdemeanor committed outside the arresting officer’s 
presence.”200 
While proponents of mandatory arrest suggest that the “in the 
presence” requirement is inappropriate for domestic cases because few 
domestic crimes will happen in the presence of police,201 there is an 
obvious rejoinder. Few crimes take place in the presence of police, and 
the fact that police are rarely present for crimes that are alleged to have 
taken place in the home is not unique. If the “in the presence” 
requirement is constitutionally required, the fact that domestic crimes 
usually are alleged to have taken place in private cannot overcome a 
constitutional requirement.  The United States Supreme Court precedent 
suggests that warrantless arrest for a domestic violence misdemeanor 
not committed in the presence of police is unconstitutional. 
 
 
 198. Id. at 360 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). When justices strongly disagree they 
write “I dissent” as opposed to “I respectfully dissent.” The dissent is important 
because a number of state courts have chosen to follow Justice O’Connor’s 
analysis as a matter of state constitutional interpretation.  See, e.g., State v. Bauer, 
36 P.3d 892, 897 (Mont. 2001); State v. Rodarte, 125 P.3d 647, 671 (N.M. 2005). 
 199. Id. at 321. 
 200. Schroeder, supra note 185, at 853. 
 201. See Crystal Cunningham, Domestic Violence: I Don't Need to Have 
Bruises to Feel Pain—A Worthy Exception to the Warrant Requirement, 28 PAC. 
L.J. 731, 734 (1997). 
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 2. Warrantless Arrest and Alaska Law 
 
In addition to the federal precedents cited above, warrantless arrest 
for a misdemeanor not occurring in the presence of police may violate 
the Alaska Constitution even if permitted by the federal constitution. As 
the Atwater Appendix showed, almost every state, as a general rule, 
forbids warrantless arrests for offenses not committed in the presence of 
police or in the presence of a citizen making an arrest.202 However, most 
states in the last thirty years have enacted statutes permitting 
warrantless arrests not committed in the presence of police under 
special circumstances, notably in domestic violence situations and for 
driving under the influence.  In Proctor v. State,203 the Alaska Court of 
Appeals upheld the DUI arrest statute: 
[T]he fourth amendment is not offended by warrantless 
searches or arrests based upon exigent circumstances. See [United 
States v.] Watson, 423 U.S. at 437 (Marshall, J., dissenting). We 
conclude that the legislature has determined that exigent 
circumstances exist where there is probable cause to believe a 
suspect is driving while intoxicated. We are not able to say that 
that legislative determination violates due process. 
Consequently, we find no violation of either the state or federal 
Constitution.204 
The Alaska court’s citation of Marshall’s dissent merits comment.  
Watson was a case in which postal inspectors performed a warrantless 
arrest in a felony, where Watson was known to be in possession of 
stolen credit cards.205 Although federal agents had time to apply for a 
search warrant or arrest warrant, they did not.206 The majority held that 
because this was a felony no arrest warrant was needed.207 
 Marshall, however, disagreed with this reasoning and would have 
upheld the arrest on the ground that there were valid “exigent 
circumstances” to justify immediate arrest without a warrant: “Watson’s 
warrantless arrest was valid under the recognized exigent-circumstances 
exception to the warrant requirement, and the Court has no occasion to 
 
 202. See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 355–60. 
 203. 643 P.2d 5 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982). 
 204. Id. at 7 (emphasis added). 
 205. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 413 (1976). 
 206. Id. at 414. 
 207. Id. at 418 (“The cases construing the Fourth Amendment thus reflect the 
ancient common-law rule that a peace officer was permitted to arrest without a 
warrant for a misdemeanor or felony committed in his presence as well as for a 
felony not committed in his presence if there was reasonable ground for making 
the arrest.”). 
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consider whether a warrant would otherwise be necessary.”208  By citing 
Marshall specifically, the Alaska Court of Appeals seemed to embrace 
Marshall’s reasoning. The court permitted warrantless arrest for DUI not 
committed in the presence of officers, but it specifically noted that the 
on-going danger posed by DUI was an exigent circumstance.209 Of 
course, this will not be true in every single DUI. The Welsh case (which 
was decided after Proctor) provides an excellent example: when the 
suspect had returned to his own home, the exigency had dissipated.  
Therefore, although Proctor upheld a warrantless misdemeanor arrest, 
the statement that “the fourth amendment is not offended by 
warrantless searches or arrests based upon exigent circumstances” 
suggests that exigent circumstances are required to dispense with the 
warrant requirement. 
The circumstances for many domestic assaults will amount to an 
exigency demanding immediate arrest, but many situations, perhaps 
even the vast majority of domestic violence investigations, do not 
involve such circumstances. This is at least suggested by the Anchorage 
ten year study which found that in 24.1% of cases, no physical injury 
was claimed; in 18.5% of cases an injury was claimed but there was none 
or none visible; in 34.9% of cases, injuries were “minor” and in only 
22.6% injuries were described as moderate or major.210  More statistical 
analysis in this area is needed.  Just because there is no injury or a minor 
injury does not necessarily mean there is not serious, imminent danger; 
and conversely, a serious injury does not necessarily mean there was a 
crime or is any ongoing danger.  Nevertheless, the numbers suggest that 
mandatory arrest may be applied overwhelmingly in circumstances 
with very minor offenses that do not occur in the presence of officers. 
“[P]laintiffs seeking facial invalidation of a law must establish at least 
 
 208. Id. at 435 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 209. See Proctor, 643 P.2d at 7. 
 210. See MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE, supra note 7, at 17. These statistics do 
not include non-violent offenses classified as domestic violence. One further 
note from the Alaska Public Defender database:  The Public Defender has a 
computer database called Practice Manager into which every criminal case is 
entered.  This includes information on charges and whether the offense is 
categorized as domestic violence or not.  This author ran a computer search of 
that database in September of 2010 and found 6,861 misdemeanor assaults and 
3,584 felony assaults charged.  Of these assaults, 2,348 misdemeanor assaults 
were classified as domestic, and 323 felony assaults were classified as domestic.  
So 12% of domestic violence assaults were charged as felonies, as compared to 
42% felony for non-domestic assaults.  Thus a relatively small percent of 
domestic violence assaults involve a weapon or serious injury (making it a 
felony), and non-domestic assaults are three-and-a-half times more likely to 
involve a weapon or serious injury. 
CLARK_CPCXNS.DOC 12/9/2010  3:37:09 PM 
194 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [27:2 
that the law does not have a ‘plainly legitimate sweep.’”211 Further 
research may be able to demonstrate that the mandatory arrest statute 
does not have a plainly legitimate sweep. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that Alaska’s statute requiring arrest for 
misdemeanors classified (somewhat arbitrarily) as “domestic violence” 
is unconstitutional for at least three reasons.  To some extent all three 
arguments can be boiled down to the following: arrest is appropriate 
only when needed to protect the community or apprehend criminals 
who might otherwise escape detection, but it is not appropriate to 
punish a particular group of alleged offenders who are politically 
unpopular.  Because warrantless arrest must be based upon exigent 
circumstances, mandatory warrantless arrest is never appropriate unless 
there is a threat of continued violence.  While there is a justifiable 
concern that police will misuse their discretion, there is probably no way 
to eliminate police discretion.  Given the appeals court’s frequent 
criticisms of the scope of Alaska’s domestic violence statutes, a re-
evaluation of the statute is long overdue. 
 
 
 211.  Treacy v. Municipality of Anchorage, 91 P.3d 252, 268 (Alaska 2004). 
